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Abstract
Proofs provide detailed justification for the validity of claims and are widely used in formal
software development methods. However, they are often complex and difficult to understand, because
they use machine-oriented formalisms; they may also be based on assumptions that are not justified.
This causes concerns about the trustworthiness of using formal proofs as arguments in safety-critical
applications. Here, we present an approach to develop safety cases that correspond to formal proofs
found by automated theorem provers and reveal the underlying argumentation structure and top-level
assumptions. We concentrate on natural deduction proofs and show how to construct the safety cases
by covering the proof tree with corresponding safety case fragments.
1 Introduction
Demonstrating the safety of large and complex software-intensive systems requires marshalling large
amounts of diverse information, e.g., models, code or mathematical equations and formulas. Obviously
tools supported by automated analyses are needed to tackle this problem. For the highest assurance
levels, these tools need to produce a traceable safety argument that shows in particular where the code as
well as the argument itself depend on any external assumptions but many techniques commonly applied
to ensure software safety do not produce enough usable evidence (i.e., justification for the validity of their
claims) and can thus not provide any further insights or arguments. In contrast, in formal software safety
certification [3], formal proofs are available as evidence. However, these proofs are typically constructed
by automated theorem provers (ATPs) based on machine-oriented calculi such as resolution [10]. They
are thus often too complex and too difficult to understand, because they spell out too many low-level
details. Moreover, the proofs may be based on assumptions that are not valid, or may contain steps
that are not justified. Consequently, concerns remain about using these proofs as arguments rather than
just evidence in safety-critical applications. In this paper we address these concerns by systematically
constructing safety cases that correspond to formal proofs found by ATPs and explicitly highlight the use
of assumptions.
The approach presented here reveals and presents the proof’s underlying argumentation structure
and top-level assumptions. We work with natural deduction (ND) proofs, which are closer to human
reasoning than resolution proofs. We explain how to construct the safety cases by covering the ND proof
tree with corresponding safety case fragments. The argument is built in the same top-down way as the
proof: it starts with the original theorem to be proved as the top goal and follows the deductive reasoning
into subgoals, using the applied inference rules as strategies to derive the goals. However, we abstract
away the obvious steps to reduce the size of the constructed safety cases. The safety cases thus provide
a “structured reading guide” for the proofs that allows users to understand the claims without having to
understand all the technical details of the formal proof machinery. This paper is a continuation of our
previous work to construct safety cases from information collected during the formal verification of the
code [2], but here we concentrate on the proofs rather than the verification process.
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2 Formal Software Safety Certification
Formal software safety certification uses formal techniques based on program logics to show that the
program does not violate certain conditions during its execution [3]. A safety property is an exact char-
acterization of these conditions, based on the operational semantics of the programming language. Each
safety property thus describes a class of hazards. The safety property is enforced by a safety policy, i.e.,
a set of verification rules that take initial set of safety requirements that formally represent the specific
hazards identified by a safety engineer [8], and derive a number of proof obligations. Showing the safety
of a program is thus reduced to formally showing the validity of these proof obligations: a program is
considered safe wrt. a given safety property if proofs for the corresponding safety proof obligations can
be found. Formally, this amounts to showing D∪A |= P ⇒C for each obligation i.e., the formalization
of the underlying domain theory D and a set of formal certification assumptions A entail a conjecture,
which consists of a set of premises P that have to imply the safety condition C.
The different parts of these proof obligations have different levels of trustworthiness, and a safety
case should reflect this. The hypotheses and the safety condition are inferred from the program by
a trusted software component implementing the safety policy, and their construction can already be
explained in a safety case [2]. In contrast, both the domain theory and the assumptions are manually
constructed artifacts that require particular care. In particular, the safety case needs to highlight the use
of assumptions. These have been formulated in isolation by the safety engineer and may not necessarily
be justified, and are possibly inconsistent with the domain theory. Moreover, fragments of the domain
theory and the assumptions may be used in different contexts, so the safety case must reflect which of
them are available at each context. By elucidating the reasoning behind the certification process and
drawing attention to potential certification problems, there is less of a need to trust the certification tools,
and in particular, the manually constructed artifacts.
3 Converting Natural Deduction Proofs into Safety Cases
Natural deduction [6] systems consist of a collection of proof rules that manipulate logical formulas and
transform premises into conclusions. A conjecture is proven from a set of assumptions if a repeated
application of the rules can establish it as conclusion. Here, we focus on some of the basic rules; a full
exposition of the ND calculus can be found in the literature [6].
Conversion Process. ND proofs are simply trees that start with the conjecture to be proven as root, and
have given axioms or assumed hypotheses at each leaf. Each non-leaf node is recursively justified by the
proofs that start with its children as new conjectures. The edges between a node and all of its children
correspond to the inference rule applied in this proof step. The proof tree structure is thus a representation
of the underlying argumentation structure. We can use this interpretation to present the proofs as safety
cases [7], which are structured arguments as well and represent the linkage between evidence (i.e., the
deductive reasoning of the proofs from the assumptions to the derived conclusions) and claims (i.e., the
original theorem to be proved). The general idea of the conversion from ND proofs to safety cases is
thus fairly straightforward. We consider the conclusion as a goal to be met; the premise(s) become(s)
the new subgoal(s). For each inference rule, we define a safety case template that represents the same
argumentation. The underlying similarity of proofs and safety cases has already been indicated in [7]
but as far as we know, this idea has never been fully explored or even been applied to machine-generated
proofs (see Figure 1 for some example rules and templates). Here, we use the Goal Structuring Notation
[7] as technique to explicitly represent the logical flow of the proof’s argumentation structure.
Implications. The implication elimination follows the general pattern sketched above but in the in-
troduction rule we again temporarily assume A as hypothesis together with the list of other available
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H |= A (tx) 
H |= ∀x A(x) 
J1: tx is an 
arbitrary  
fresh object 
Show for an 
arbitrary 
element of the 
domain (∀i) 
J1: x can be 
replaced by tx 
Show for all 
domain 
elements (∀e) 
H |= ∀x A(x) 
H |= A (tx) 
Safety Case Templates for ∀-Rules 
Use implication to 
reduce goal to new 
subgoal ( e) 
 
H |= (A B) H |= A 
H |= B  
H U {A} |= B 
H |= (A B) 
J1: {A} can be used 
as hypothesis to 
prove B 
Suppose premise 
is true ( i) 
Figure 1: Safety Case Templates for Natural Deduction Rules
hypotheses, rather than deriving a proof for it. We then proceed to derive B, and discharge the hypoth-
esis by the introduction of the implication. The hypothesis A can be used at given in the prove of B,
but the conclusion A ⇒ B no longer depends on the hypothesis A after B has been proved. In the safety
case fragment, we use a justification to record the use of the hypothesis A, and thus to make sure that the
introduced hypotheses are tracked properly.
Universal quantifiers. The ND proof rules for quantifiers focus on the replacement of the bound
variables with objects and vice versa. For example, in the elimination rule for universal quantifiers, we
can conclude the validity of the formula for any chosen domain element tx. In the introduction rule,
however, we need to show it for an arbitary but fresh object tx (that is, a domain element which does not
appear elsewhere in H , A, or the domain theory and assumptions). If we can derive a proof of A, where x
is replaced by the object tx, we can then discharge this assumption by introduction of the quantifier. The
safety case fragments record this replacement as justification. The hypotheses available for the subgoals
in the ∀-rules are the same as those in the original goals.
4 Hypothesis Handling
An automated prover typically treats the domain theory D and the certification assumptions A as premises
and tries to derive ∧(D∪A)∧P ⇒C from an empty set of hypotheses. As the proof tree grows, these
premises will be turned into hypotheses, using the ⇒- introduction rule (see Figure 1). In all other rules,
the hypotheses are simply inherited from the goal to the subgoals. However, not all hypotheses will
actually be used in the proof, and the safety case should highlight those that are actually used. This is
particularly important for the certification assumptions. We can achieve this by modifying the template
for the ⇒- introduction (see Figure 2a). We can distinguish between the hypotheses that are actually
used in the proof of the conclusion (denoted by A1, ...,Ak) and those that are vacuously discharged by
the ⇒- introduction (denoted by Ak + 1, ..,An). We can thus use two different justifications to mark this
distinction. Note that this is only a simplification of the presentation and does not change the structure
of the underlying proof, nor the validity of the original goal. It is thus different from using a relevant
implication [1] under which A ⇒ B is only valid if the hypothesis A is actually used.
In order to minimize the number of hypotheses tracked by the safety case, we need to analyze the
proof tree from the leaves up, and propagate the hypotheses towards the root. By revealing only these
used hypotheses as assumptions, the validity of their use in deriving the proof can be checked more easily.
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prove B Suppose premises 
{A1,..,Ak} are true 
(i) J2: {Ak+1,…,AN} not 
used to prove B 
a) 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hypothesis has_unit(float_7_0e_ 
minus_1,ang_vel) is valid 
Hypothesis is built by using 
ang_vel_7_0e_minus_1_ rule 
from the valid axiom  
Argument over 
establishment of 
hypothesis  
 
(Axiom) 
ang_vel_7_0
e_minus_1_  
C1:has_unit(float
_7_0e_ minus_1, 
ang_vel) is an 
external 
hypothesis  
Conclusion has_unit(float_7_0e_ 
minus_1,ang_vel) is valid 
Argument over 
Muscadet 
stop_hyp_ rule  
J1: The 
conclusion 
is valid if the 
hypothesis 
is valid 
The conclusion to be 
proved is an external 
hypothesis  
b) 
Figure 2: Hypothesis Handling
In our work, we also highlight the use of the external certification assumptions that have been formulated
in isolation by the safety engineer. For example, in Figure 2b, the hypothesis has unit(float 7 0e minus 1,
ang vel), meaning that a particular floating point variable represents an angular velocity, has been speci-
fied as external assumption. This is tracked properly in the safety case, and its role in deriving the proofs
can be checked easily.
5 Proof Abstraction
We have applied our approach to proofs found by the Muscadet [9] theorem prover during the formal
certification of the frame safety of a component of an attitude control system as an example. Muscadet is
based on ND, but to improve performance, it implements a variety of derived rules in addition to the basic
rules of the calculus. This includes rules for dedicated equality handling, as well as rules that the system
builds from the definitions and lemmas, and that correspond the application of the given definitions and
lemmas. While these rules make the proofs shorter, their large number makes the proofs also in turn
more difficult to understand. This partially negates the original goal of using a ND prover. We thus
plan to optimize the resulting proofs by removing some of the book-keeping rules (e.g., return proof)
that are not central to the overall argumentation structure. Similarly, we plan to collapse sequences of
identical book-keeping rules into a single node. In general, however, we try to restructure the resulting
proof presentation to help in emphasizing the essential proof steps. In particular, we plan to group
sub-proofs that apply only axioms and lemmas from selected parts of the domain theory (e.g., ground
arithmetic or partial order reasoning) and represent them as a single strategy application. Figure 3 shows
an example of this. Here, the first abstraction step collapses the sequences rooted in G13 and G14, noting
the lemmas which had been used as strategies as justifications, but keeping the branching that is typical
for the transitivity. A second step then abstracts this away as well.
6 Conclusions
We have described an approach whereby a safety case is used as a “structured reading” guide for the
safety proofs. Here, assurance is not implied by the trust in the ATPs but follows from the constructed
argument of the underlying proofs. However, the straightforward conversion of ND proofs into safety
cases turn out to be far from satisfactory as the proofs typically contain too many details. In practice, a
superabundance of such details is overwhelming and unlikely to be of interest anyway so careful use of
abstraction is needed [5].
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Figure 3: Abstraction of Proof Safety Case
The work we have described here is still in progress. So far, we have automatically derived safety
cases for the proofs found by the Muscadet prover [9]. This work complements our previous work [2]
where we used the high-level structure of annotation inference to explicate the top-level structure of such
software safety cases. We consider the safety case as a first step towards a fully-fledged software certifi-
cate management system [4], which provides a range of certification services such as maintaining links
between different system artifacts and different varieties of informal and formal certificates, checking
their validity, or providing access to explicit audit trails. We also believe that our research will result in
a comprehensive safety case (i.e., for the program being certified the safety logic, and the certification
system) that will clearly communicate the safety claims, key safety requirements, and evidence required
to trust the software safety.
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